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IMMIGRATION

IMMIGRATION: THE STATUS OF CUBAN REFUGEES
IN THE UNITED STATES
The dedication of America to our tradition as an asylum for the
oppressed will be upheld.
-President Lyndon B. Johnson
October 3, 1965
Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.
-United States ex rel.Knauff v. Shaughnessy'
Fidel Castro-Ruiz came to power in Cuba on January 1, 1959. Since that
time, refugees from the Castro regime have continually immigrated to the
United States under various legal procedures. The number of such persons
reached more than 267,000 by June 30, 1964,2 but the rate declined in the
following year. 3 In October 1965, however, the President announced that
persons fleeing Cuba could find refuge in the United States. A month later
when negotiations were concluded, an airlift of 3,000 to 4,000 refugees per
month was initiated, which transported 26,000 Cuban refugees to the United
States by mid-1966 4 and another 44,000 by mid-1967.5
The entry of Cuban refugees follows nearly two decades of legislative and
6
executive refugee policy. Begun in 1948 with the Displaced Persons Act,
which admitted more than 400,000 persons under a plan "mortgaging" future
import quotas, additional refugees were admitted under the Refugee Relief
Act of 1953. 7 Following the Hungarian revolution of 1956, 6,000 Hungarian
refugees were admitted under the Refugee Relief Act, and 32,000 were
paroled into the United States. Special legislation provided for the adjustment of the status of these parolees to that of permanent residents. 8 More
limited items of refugee legislation were enacted in succeeding years.9 It is
this legislation, in addition to the general provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 195210 that provides the basic statutory
structure under which the admission of Cuban refugees has been administered21
The peculiarity of the situation of a national of one country residing
within a host country for an indefinite time raises intriguing questions of
1. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
2.

1964 ANNUAL

3. 1965

RFPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 4.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 4.

4. 1966 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 6.
5. 1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 6.

6. 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as amended, 64 Stat. 219 (1950); 66 Stat. 277 (1952).
7. 67 Stat. 400 (1953).

8. 72 Stat. 419 (1958).
9. E.g., in 1957 unused visas of the Refugee Relief Act were in part alloted to "refugee
escapees," 71 Stat. 643 (1957). Up to 25% of the refugee escapees mandated to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were made paroleable under 74 Stat. 504 (1960).
10. 66 Stat. 166 (1952) [hereinafter cited as the Act of 1952].
11. The foregoing discussion of the history of refugee legislation has been summarized
from 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFiELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §2.27h (1) (1966).
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the scope of constitutional and statutory protections applicable to such a
person. If the refugee is res nullius according to international law 12 is he
entitled to due process of law? Can he establish a domicile within the host
country? Can he establish "permanent" residence in order to be eligible for
certain tax exemptions? Fortunately, less metaphysical starting points than
the nature of res nullius are available for examination of most of these
questions.
It is the aim of this note, therefore, to look into the status of Cuban
refugees. Considered will be the various legal devices employed to facilitate
admission of the refugees and the resulting legal consequences of certain
modes of admission. The legal incidents of permanent residence status will
also be examined.
METHODS OF ADMISSION

The first refugees from Cuba entered the United States through rather
conventional means, employing visas obtained from American consuls
abroad to apply for admission as immigrants or nonimmigrants. The nonimmigrant classification includes aliens entering the country temporarily as
tourists, students, visitors, and so forth. 13 Due to the changing political
climate in Cuba, however, many Cubans who were in the United States
requested political asylum. The original procedure utilized to grant asylum
was to institute deportation proceedings'4 in the course of which the alien
would be given the opportunity to apply for a stay of deportation on the
ground that deportation to Cuba would make him subject to persecution in
that country." 5 Owing to the increased volume of refugees, however, a more
streamlined procedure was developed under which aliens were given an
indefinite time to depart the United States, deportation proceedings not
being instituted.16
The rupture of diplomatic and consular relations between the United
States and Cuba added further complications. After severance of relations,
transportation of Cuban refugees was hampered by the absence of an American consular office in Cuba to grant visas. This situation caused transportation companies to be liable to a fine for carrying Cubans without visas to the
United States.' 7 A transitory solution was found in section 212 (a) (4) of the
Act of 1952 whereby the Attorney General and the Secretary of State were
jointly empowered to waive passport and visa requirements for a nonimmigrant "on the basis of unforeseen emergency in individual cases."' 8 Under
12.
13.

1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (4th ed. 1960).
Letter from C. G. Yeager, Deputy District Director of the Immigration and Naturali-

zation Service, in

Miami, Florida, to J.

Patton Hyman, Nov. 28, 1967.

For a complete

classification of nonimmigrants, see 8 U.S.C. §1101 (15) (1964).
14. See 8 U.S.C. §1252 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
15. 8 U.S.C. §1253 (h) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
16. Letter from C. G. Yeager, supra note 13.

17.

8 U.S.C. §1323 (1964).

18. 8 U.S.C. §1182(d) (4) (A) (1964).
grants, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (26) (1964).

For the documentary requirements of nonimmi-
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administrative regulations, this procedure is not available to a national or
resident of Cuba embarking for the United States on or after December 16,
1963, unless such person proceeds directly- from Cuba and has been inspected
there by certain American government officials.1 9 The difficulty with this
method, however, was that the refugees were not bona fide "nonimmigrants"
to whom the documentary waiver was available "as they were intending to
remain here indefinitely and many intended to accept employment in this
20
country; therefore they could not be admitted as nonimmigrants."
The most recent solution is to admit Cuban refugees as parolees. The
parole power is within the discretion of the Attorney General who may, for
certain reasons, temporarily parole into the United States aliens seeking
admission.21 As a condition to granting parole, the Attorney General may
23
require the posting of bond22 or may impose restrictions upon the alien,
such as place of residence, activities, and movement. As a matter of practice,
24
however, this rarely done.
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE METHOD OF ENTRY AND CONTINUED PRESENCE

The most striking observation to be made regarding the admission of
Cuban refugees is that the procedures employed are in fact broad extensions
of what were originally intended to be limited statutory means of accomplishing limited administrative ends. The frequent result in litigation is that
when judicially pronounced rules surrounding the old statutory categories
are applied to refugee cases, the realities of the refugee's situation are often
obscured.
This result is noticeable, for example, in the cases of refugees granted
an indefinite time for departure, and more importantly in the case of the
parolee status of many Cuban refugees. The utilization of an indefinite
departure time is an administrative adaptation of the discretionary statutory
power of the Attorney General to dispense with "deportation proceedings,
including issuance of a warrant of arrest, and a finding of deportability ...
in the case of any alien who admits to belonging to a class of aliens who are
deportable . ..if such alien voluntarily departs from the United States at
his own expense, or is removed at Government expense .... , 5 The purposes
26
and advantages of voluntary departure have been summarized as follows:
First, it avoids the stigma of compulsory ejection. Second, it facilitates
the possibility of return to the United States. Thus a deported alien
needs special permission if he seeks to return and faces criminal penalties if he attempts to reenter without such permission. These sanctions
19.
20.
21.
22.

8 C.F.R. §212.1 (f (Supp. 1968).
Letter from C. G. Yeager, supra note 13.
8 U.S.C. §1182 (d) (5) (1964).
8 U.S.C. §1182 (d) (6) (1964).

23. 8 US.C. §1182 (d) (5) (1964).
24. Letter from C. G. Yeager, supra note 13.
25. 8 US.C. §1252 (b) (1964). The power to grant voluntary departure has been delegated to "district directors, district officers who are in charge of investigations, officers in
charge, and chief patrol inspectors." 8 C.F.R. §242.5 (a) (Supp. 1968).
26. C. GoRDoN & H. RosEr=iou, supra note 11, at §7.2a.
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do not apply to an alien who has departed voluntarily before a final
order of expulsion was ordered against him. Third, departure often
entails the certainty of speedy return, particularly if coupled with
other dispensations, such as advance waiver of existing objections to
entry. Fourth, it enables the applicant to select his own destination.
This is, of course, a far cry from using an altered form of voluntary
departure as a makeshift method of providing for refugees. For there is a
definite distinction between the "classical" function of voluntary departure
to ameliorate the rigors of deportation and the expectations of the refugee
who, relying upon indefinite departure status, may have sought and obtained
employment, contracted obligations, or established family ties. The hardship is
more apparent when the refugee is able to return shortly under another form
of entry such as parole, and the departure is a mere formality. Yet the Fifth
Circuit has held that, because the status is a privilege or "matter of grace,"
"
there is no violation of due process in revoking it without a hearing. 2
A similar situation prevails with parole, although a less stringent approach
has developed in the Second Circuit.2-8 The statutory provision for parole
29
appears in section 212 (d) (5) of the Act of 1952, under which:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United
States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for
emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest
any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such
parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien
and when the purposes of the parole shall, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return
or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as
that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
The parole power has been delegated to district directors in charge of ports
of entry and may be exercised prior to or subsequent to examination by an
immigration officer, pending a final determination of admissibility or after
a finding of inadmissibility. 30 Parole is terminable upon the expiration of
the period of time for which it was granted, upon the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was granted, or when, in the district director's opinion,
neither emergency nor the public interest warrants the continued presence of
the alien. 31 Upon revocation of parole, the alien is returned to the status held
at the time of parole, that is, for further examination as to admissibility or
for execution of the order of exclusion or deportation. However, if execution
of either of the latter orders cannot take place within a reasonable time, the
alien will again be paroled unless the public interest requires his continued
2
custodyA
27. Gomez-Fernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 316 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1963).
28. United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958). See text
accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
29. 8 U.S.C. §1182(d) (5) (1964).
30. 8 C.F.R. §212.5 (a) (Supp. 1968).
31.
32.

Id.
Id.; see the last clause of 8 U.S.C. §1182 (d) (5) (1964).
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At this point the technical distinctions drawn between exdusion and
deportation and between admission and mere permission to land temporarily
should be noted. When one has been "admitted" to the United States and
remains within its borders, he can be compeiled to depart only by "deportation" or "expulsion" for which a hearing is required by statute.33 However,
when an alien has not been legally admitted he may be "excluded" with much
less rigorous standards and procedures available for his protection.34 The
most extreme expression of this lack of constitutional protection was made
by the Supreme Court in 1950 when it was stated that "[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned."3 5 And under this reasoning, an alien is not considered admitted or "within the United States" when he has entered under
a temporary status.3 6
In its original form, parole was a temporary remedy to prevent unnecessary detention while proceedings were taking place and to allow, for
example, an inadmissible alien to enter the United States for medical treatment. In that context it is reasonable to continue to regard the paroled
alien as not being within the United States. However, when parole is
expanded to constitute the principal method of admitting large numbers of
refugees for an indefinite period of time, the fiction of absence loses much
of its validity. At least one federal district court observed that the legal
fiction "strains credulity" when the parolee's sojourn in the United States is
37
prolonged and family ties are established.
It has been assumed, however, that since an alien outside the United
States - the position to which a parolee is relegated - has no legal right to
admission, the parolee is not denied due process of law when his parole is
revoked without a hearing. In Ahrens v. Rojas,3 8 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied that a Cuban refugee had a right to a hearing on the revocation of his parole, reasoning that his status was the same as if he had been
"stopped at the border." 3' 9 The Board of Immigration Appeals has reached the
40
same result.
These cases have implicitly recognized - and distinguished however - the
important inroad on the denial of hearings in parole revocation represented
33. 8 U.S.C. §1152 (1964). Part (b) of this section requires that in cases of deportation
(as opposed to exclusion) the regulations must provide for notice to the putative deportee of the nature of the charges against him, his right to representation by counsel as
his own expense, and the opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present
evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine government witnesses.
34. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1958); Ahrens v.
Rojas, 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961).
35. United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 587, 544 (1950).
36. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958). In this context, temporary status
is not meant to comprehend, e.g., tourist visas containing time limits.
37. United States ex rel. Stellas v. Esperdy, 250 F. Supp. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
38. 292 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1961).

39. Id. at 410. A similar result was reached in the case of revocation of the parole
of a Chinese alien in Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 885 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1964).
40. In re M__ B_,
8 Administrative Decisions under Immigration and Nationality
Laws of the United States 406 (1959) [hereinafter cited as I.D.).
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by United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff.41 Paktorovics was a Hungarian
refugee paroled into the United States and subsequently excluded on the sole
ground that he did not have a visa, charges that he had "communistic tendencies" having been dropped. A hearing was held solely on the question
whether Paktorovics possessed a visa, although, as Judge Medina noted in the
court's opinion, everyone concerned was well aware that he did not. On
appeal from the district court's denial of habeas corpus, the Government
contended that this was a simple case of exclusion and that no hearing
was required. The Second Circuit took exception to this reasoning pointing out that Paktorovics, as a Hungarian refugee, was sui generis for he
"was invited here pursuant to the announced foreign policy of the United
States as formulated by the President in his directive of December 1, 1956.
. . . Furthermore," the court continued, "the Congress has recently enacted
legislation endorsing the extraordinary action of the President ...
"."2This
was sufficient, according to the court, to effect a change in the relator's
status to entitle him to the protections of the Constitution; hence, restricting
the hearing to the existence of a visa was improper. In order to avoid holding
the statute unconstitutional as denying due process, the court construed it
3
to require a hearing in this instance.4
This reasoning is apposite to the present status of Cuban parolees. The
President has extended a similar invitation to Cuban refugees, and a plan for
their transportation has been in operation since late 1965. 4 4 Likewise, Congress has implicitly sanctioned this policy by enacting special provisions for
the adjustment of the status of Cuban refugees to that of permanent residents. 4 5 Thus, although no cases of Cuban refugees have been decided on
this point since the actions of the President and Congress, it seems likely
that under the reasoning of Paktorovics the right to a hearing will be extended to Cuban parolees admitted through the President's invitation. But
the question may legitimately be raised whether there is any sufficient reason
in policy not to extend similar protection to Cuban refugees admitted on
parole or other temporary status prior to the actions of the President and
Congress. Ideally, the technical results of the fiction of absence should be
laid to rest in refugee cases and rights should be determined on a more
meaningful basis. In any event, however, the Paktorovics solution is a
significant step in the right direction.
Once parole is revoked, the alien is returned to the status occupied at
the time parole was granted' 6 which in the case of refugee-parolees will
usually be that of an alien seeking admission. If the immigration authorities
seek to exclude the alien permanently, a hearing before a special inquiry
officer is required47 from whose decision an appeal to the Attorney General
is available as a matter of right.48 Although in ordinary exclusion proceedings
41.
44.

260 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958).
1967 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

45.
46.
47.
48.

80 Stat. 1161 (1966), amending 8 U.S.C. §1255 (c) (1964).
8 U.S.C. §1182(d) (5) (1964).
8 U.S.C. §1226 (a) (1964).
8 U.S.C. §1226(b) (1964). An order of exclusion is reviewable judicially by de-

42.

Id. at 614.

IMMIGRATION
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many grounds for avoiding exclusion are provided, the ability of the refugeeparolee to resist exclusion at this point is closely circumscribed. For example,
the absence of passport of visa, which he is unlikely to possess, is a sufficient
ground in itself for exclusion.49 Thus, if his parole is revocable without a
hearing, his remedies are, for practical purposes, at an end.
Even the grounds for staying his deportation afford little relief. Such a
stay is available only if the Attorney General considers that the prospective
deportee's testimony "is necessary on behalf of the United States in the
prosecution of offenders" under its laws. 50 Furthermore, the ground for
waiver under section 243 (h) of the Act of 1952, as amended, that the alien
"would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opinion" 5' in his native country - often appropriate in the case of refugees may be entirely unavailable to him as a parolee. In Leng May Ma v. Barber52
a native of China was released on parole pending a determination of her
claim to citizenship. Ordered permanently excluded, she applied for a stay
of deportation on the ground of persecution under the predecessor of the
present section 243 (h). The United States Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision
ruled that that provision for stay could not be invoked by her as she was
not, as a parolee, "within the United States" as required by section 243 (h).
For the majority, Justice Clark noted the distinction between "exclusion" of a
person who is not within the United States actually or in contemplation of
law and "expulsion" of a person who has legally been admitted to the
United States by pointing out that section 243 was within part V of the Act
dealing with expulsion, not within the exclusion provisions of part IV to
which she was being subjected. He reasoned that this result was reinforced
by the statutory provision authorizing parole, which states that parole "shall
not be regarded as admission of the alien." 53 The dissenting justices pointed
out that the parole provision refers to paroling "into the United States," but
the gravamen of the dissent was that section 243 (h) ought to be read broadly
to further the humane goal to which it was directed.
It is still a matter of speculation whether this limitation will be applied
by technical ratiocination to parolees such as Cubans for whom the parolee
status is an administrative means to effect a refugee program for an indefinite
period of time. The Paktorovics rationale seems as appropriate here as in the
54
context in which it was developed.
claratory judgment as well as by habeas corpus. Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
49. 8 US.C. §1182 (a) (26) (1964). But cf. text following note 66.
50. 8 U.S.C. §1227 (d) (1964).
51. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (Supp. II, 1966), amending 8 U.S.C. §1253 (h) (1964), which provides: "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as
he deems to be necessary for such reason."
52. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
53. 8 U.S.C. §1182 (d) (5) (1964).
54. Incidentally, it should be noticed that when waiver of deportation is available,
judicial review of its denial may be strictly limited to procedural due process and to possible
arbitrariness in the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. See Blazina v. Bouchard, 286
F.2d 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1961); Cakmar v. Hoy, 265 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.
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RESIDENCE

Section 245 of the Act of 1952, as amended, provides:55
The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be
adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion ...to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien
makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to
receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for
permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately
available to him at the time his application is approved.
This procedure was enacted to allow potential permanent residents to avoid
the expense of leaving the country under an administratively developed
practice (generally to Canada) and then applying for readmission, with
permanent residence status assured in advance. 50 Thus, under the new scheme
an alien may have his status adjusted merely by complying with the statutory
requirements. This apparatus is not available, however, "to any alien who
is a native of any country of the Western Hemisphere or of any adjacent
island named in section 1101 (b) (5) of this title,"' 7 including Cuba.5 8 In
1966, Congress recognized the problems created under this section by the
influx of Cuban refugees and responded by amending the statute to make an
exception. Accordingly, any Cuban native or citizen who has been physically
present in the United States for at least two years may have his status adjusted
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if he (1) makes
application, (2) is eligible to receive an immigrant visa, and (3) is admissible
to the United States as a permanent resident.5 9
Permanent resident status entails significant advantages over temporary
statuses in general. The permanent resident can avail himself of more procedural protections if his expulsion is sought for any lawful reason. He can
remain in the United States at his pleasure and engage in lawful occupations
and employment. He may apply for nationalization and may travel to and
from the United States freely. 60
The last item is subject to qualification, however, with respect to the
right not to be excluded upon reentry. In the almost melodramatic case of
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,61 the relator had been admitted to
1959); United States ex rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 200 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1952);
Vardjan v. Esperdy, 197 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States ex rel. Paschalidis v.
District Director, 143 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Denial of an application for waiver of
deportation is a final order under §106 of the Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §1105 (a), reviewable by
the courts of appeals. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
Contra, Li Cheung v. Esperdy, 377 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1967), not mentioning Foti.

55. 8 U.S.C. §1255 (a) (1964).
56. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 11, at §7.7a.
57. 8 U.S.C. §1255 (c) (Supp. II, 1966), amending 8 U.S.C. §1255 (c) (1964).
58. 8 U.S.C. §1101 (b) (5) (1964).

59. 80 Stat. 1161 (1966), amending 8 U.S.C. §1255 (c) (1964).
60. Summarized from C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 11, at §1.32.
61. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
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the United States as a permanent resident and had lived in Buffalo for twentyfive years with his family when he left to visit his dying mother in Rumania.
Not allowed to enter Rumania, he remained in Hungary for nineteen months
until he received a quota immigration visa from American consular officials.
Upon arrival at New York he was ordered temporarily excluded, and the
exclusion order was shortly made permanent on the basis of confidential
information. No hearing was granted. As no other country was at the time
willing to accept Mezei, he was confined on Ellis Island indefinitely. On
petition for habeas corpus, the district court ordered him temporarily admitted
on bond. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court reversed.
The core of the reasoning was stated as follows:62
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law...
But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different
footing: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." [United
States ex rel.] Knauff v. Shaughnessy [338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)] ....
And because the action of the executive officer under such authority
is final and conclusive, the Attorney General cannot be compelled
to disclose the evidence underlying his determination in an exclusion
case.... In a case such as this, courts cannot retry the determination
of the Attorney General.
The Court distinguished Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding6- in which an alien
whose status had been adjusted to permanent resident was not allowed to be
"excluded" (as Mezei was) and could be subject only to "expulsion" or
deportation under the protections of due process. There, said the Court, the
alien had obtained "full security clearance and documentation" before leaving
the United States, whereas Mezei had no reentry papers or authorization.In a footnote the Court pointed out, however, that even the possession of
reentry papers did not automatically entitle the permanent resident alien
to admission if he is inadmissible on any statutory ground. 65 The conclusion
from this reasoning is that the permanent resident travels from the United
States at his own risk, especially when there is an available ground upon
which he may be excluded. In the case of Cuban refugees admitted on parole
and without visas, the mere absence of visa may be sufficient to bar reentry
should the Government deem such alien's presence undesirable.66 It is, of
course, possible that, as a matter of construction, this provision might be held
inapplicable - perhaps waived 67 - upon reentry because the provision for
adjusting the status of Cubans contemplates the possibility of lawful admis62.

Id. at 212.

63. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
64. 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953).
65.

Id.

66. 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a) (26) (1964).
67. Is this not indeed the implication of United States ex reL Paktorovics v. Murf, 260
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958), in the context of parole revocation?
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sion on parole without visa; but this interpretation is not compelled by a
literal reading of the statute.
The procedure for rescission of the permanent residence status is less
Draconian under the procedures established by section 246 of the Act of 195268
and the regulations enacted pursuant thereto. The statute specifies that the
rescission must take place within five years of the adjustment of status; 69
however, the Attorney General has ruled that section 246 limits only rescission
to five years and does not bar an exclusion proceeding based on fraudulent
procurement of an entry visa prior to the supposed permanent resident's
adjustment of status. 70 The status may be rescinded if the Attorney General
is satisfied that the alien "was not in fact eligible for such adjustment of
status,"'71 and such ineligibility includes any fact available that would have
72
barred admission originally.
According to the regulations, 73 notice of the allegations grounding rescission and the right to employ counsel must be given, and the respondent alien
must submit an answer within thirty days. 74 If the respondent wishes to
contest rescission, he may request a hearing before a special inquiry officer75
who is empowered to conduct the hearing, examine the respondent, and
arrive at a decision. 76 At the hearing, the parties may present evidence and
interrogate and cross-examine the witnesses, including respondent. 77 The
decision of the special inquiry officer may be oral or written and, unless based
on respondent's admissions, "shall include a discussion of the evidence and
findings as to rescission," although the "formal enumeration of findings is
not required."7 Either party may appeal the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 79 and for the consideration of material evidence, which was
not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the original
hearing, the case may be reopened upon the motion of the special inquiry, or
of either party.80
CUBAN

REFUGEES IN FLORIDA COURTS

Although there is a dearth of reported cases from Florida courts touching
on the status of Cuban refugees, those available have often discussed the

68. 8 U.S.C. §1256 (1964).
69. Id. at §1256 (a) (1964).
70. In re S., 9 Administrative Decisions under Immigration and Nationality Laws of
the United States 548, 557 (1962).

71. 8 U.S.C. §1256(a) (1964).
72. 8 U.S.C. §1255 (a) (1964). See generally 8 U.S.C. §1182 (a) (1964), as amended, (Supp.
II, 1966).

73. See generally 8 C.F.R. §246 (Supp. 1968).
74. Id. at §246.1.
75.

Id. at §246.3.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

80.

Id. at §246.8.

§246.4.
§246.5.
§246.6.
§246.7.
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"temporary" nature of the refugee's admission. In Juarrero v. McNayr,8'
taxpayers, who were Cuban refugees, sued to compel the allowance of the
homestead exemption 2 against their ad valorem taxes. The chancellor dismissed the suit with prejudice, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
Although the court noted that American citizenship is not a prerequisite to
claiming homestead exemption, it held that the taxpayers were in contemplation of law unable to obtain "permanent residence" in Florida. The homestead exemption statute defines "residence" as "that place which the person
claiming the exemption may rightfully and in good faith call his home to
the exclusion of all other places where he may, from time to time, temporarily
8 4
reside,"83 and the Florida constitution requires "permanent" residence
Hence, reasoned the court, as taxpayers enjoyed only a temporary status indefinite voluntary departure- they could not make or declare "rightfully
and in good faith" an intention to reside permanently.
Subsequent congressional action has rendered the Juarrerorationale untenable. Recent legislation allowing the adjustment of status of Cuban
natives or citizens to permanent residence,8 5 means that Cuban refugees
originally admitted on a temporary basis can now form the requisite intent to
reside permanently in Florida.
In a divorce case, 8 however, the Third District Court of Appeal held that
the temporary status of a Cuban refugee did not hamper the latter's capacity
to acquire domicile for purposes of divorce jurisdiction. The court distinguished Juarreroon the ground that in the instant case there was no requirement of intention tc make a "permanent home" as was constitutionally
required for homestead exemption.
A federal district court in Florida, exercising diversity jurisdiction, made
the following observation upon the status of Cuban refugees in Florida:87
These former political citizens of a Cuba that has ceased to be
(with some inchoate allegiance to a Cuba they hope may come into
existence sometime in the future) are at present political citizens of
nowhere. They are, however, civil citizens of Florida based on their
domicile here, and they are possessed of our municipal rights and
obligated for domestic municipal duties.
CONCLUSION

Although the status of Cuban refugees continues to be based predominantly on parole and permanent residence, any future non-Cuban refugee
populations will be admitted under a recently enacted method of "condi81. 157 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1963).
82. FLA. CONSr. art. X, §7.
83. FLA. STAT. § 192.14 (1967).
84. FLA. CONST. art. X, §7.
85. 80 Stat. 1161 (1966), amending 8 U.S.C. §1255 (c) (1964).
86. Perez v. Perez, 164 So. 2d 561 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
87. Blanco v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 228 (S.D. Fla. 1963). This
reasoning, although reaching a pragmatic result, contains metaphysical elements regarding
allegiance, which would be better avoided in refugee cases.
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